Why Indonesians turn against democracy by Long, Nicholas J.
Why Indonesians turn against democracy
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101683/
Version: Accepted Version
Book Section:
Long, Nicholas J. (2016) Why Indonesians turn against democracy. In: Cook, 
Joanna, Long, Nicholas J. and Moore, Henrietta L., (eds.) The state we're in: 
reflecting on democracy's troubles. Wyse series in social anthropology,3. 
Berghahn Books, Oxford, UK, p. 42. ISBN 9781785332241 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Why Indonesians Turn Against Democracy 
 
Nicholas J. Long,  
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Abstract 
Many Indonesians who welcomed the nation’s democratisation in 1998 now look on 
democracy with horror and shame. This chapter seeks to move beyond the focus on 
corruption and socioeconomic performance, which currently dominates both the literature 
and public discourse in Indonesia, to examine some of the deeper issues that might lie 
alongside such concerns, or for which they might serve as an idiom of distress. Pursuing a 
person-centred ethnographic approach, I show how the appeal of democratisation lies in its 
promise of new modes of acting and being in the world, and yet these modes of being can 
turn out to prove so distressing or uncomfortable that the subject turns against democracy 
altogether. I focus in particular on difficulties and ambivalences surrounding the expression, 
fulfilment, and disregard of one’s desires, opinions, and familial identifications. 
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When Syamsuddin,1 a middle-aged Malay with a laundry business, installed his cable TV, it 
marked a fundamental transformation in our relationship. No longer would we sit in his front 
yard to sip coffee and discuss the latest neighbourhood goings-on; our conversations were 
relocated to an airless back room, each of us facing not the other, but a 21-inch screen. I 
rather missed the outdoor location, but Syamsuddin was in no doubt that the change had been 
for the better. He was, by his own admission, a cable TV junkie and, like many Indonesians I 
knew, would while away many happy hours watching Animal Planet documentaries or the 
National Geographic channel. His absolute favourite things to watch, however, were re-runs 
of the Obama versus Clinton debates that had been staged in the run-up to the 2008 
democratic primaries. 
 Syamsuddin had been hoping that the debate would educate him in the ways of 
democratic personhood. He explained to me that he felt that if Indonesians wanted their 
democracy to be good, they would have to learn from the people of nations such as America, 
who had been democratic for a very long time. He particularly admired Obama, who he felt 
could put his opinions across firmly but politely. For Syamsuddin, then, watching these 
debates was not an exercise in political punditry but rather an exploration of how one might 
live and act in a democratic state. As he put it, ‘I have to learn to think and speak like that!’ 
 Such an enterprise seems to be the hallmark of the project of ethical self-cultivation, 
at least as the latter has been described in a recent monograph by James Faubion (2011). 
Emphasising the processual dimension of ethical practice, Faubion insists that 
anthropologists should pay more attention to the work required to inhabit a role, to ‘savour it’ 
and live it to its fullest, rather than reducing their accounts of subjectification to moments of 
linguistic ascription (ibid.: 65-66, 160). By this light, Syamsuddin was working hard, with 
Obama as his exemplar, to inhabit the subject position of ‘democratic citizen’ that ‘had 
become him’ by virtue of Indonesia’s democratization in the late 1990s.  
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 This was in 2008. In 2011 I went back to Syamsuddin’s house, hoping to understand 
in more detail the relationship between democratisation and ethical life. He greeted me 
warmly and, in front of the TV screen, asked me what I was now working on.  I answered 
‘democracy’. 
 ‘Democracy?!’ he replied, raising his eyebrows in a disdainful way. ‘I can tell you all 
you need to know about democracy! It’s no good. No good! Better to have a caliphate. Or a 
dictatorship.’ 
 His remarks took me by surprise. ‘But last time we met, you seemed so enthusiastic 
about democracy,’ I protested. ‘We watched Obama together!’ 
 Syamsuddin deflated. ‘Oh man,’ he said, ‘I was hoping you weren’t going to 
remember that. You know, I was so arrogant back then. Man! Man!’ He grew alarmed. 
‘Please tell me you haven’t written that I liked democracy in your book! I’m anti-democracy 
now.’ 
 
* * * 
 
On May 21 1998, Indonesia’s President Suharto announced that he would be stepping down 
from office. His resignation signalled the end of 32 years of authoritarian rule under his ‘New 
Order’ regime, and the start of a new phase of the nation’s political life – one characterised as 
an era of ‘reform’ and ‘democratisation’ by both Indonesians and outside observers. At the 
time, as Joshua Barker (2007: 87) notes, many Indonesia-watchers were convinced that ‘the 
New Order would reconstitute itself in all but name or that the country would descend into 
communitarian violence’. However, the early 2000s were instead marked by ‘a surprising 
degree of democratisation’ (ibid.: 88), prompting many to hail the country’s transition to 
democracy as a remarkable success story that ‘present[ed] valuable lessons for other 
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countries’ (Aspinall 2010b: 20).  
 A key dimension of this positive story has been the observation that – whatever 
shortcomings persist at the level of elite politics or within political institutions – there is 
tremendous public support for democracy, and a repudiation of the violent and repressive 
styles of government that characterised the New Order. Tony Day (2007: 2), for example, has 
argued that ‘after 32 years of authoritarian rule under Suharto and his New Order, 
Indonesians are crazy about many kinds of freedoms (kebebasan) – freedoms that are 
subjective and sexual as well as public and political’, whilst Suzanne Brenner (2007: 35) 
found ‘very few’ of the Indonesian women she worked with ‘would wish to return to the days 
of authoritarian rule.’ In 2013, Indonesia’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hassan 
Wirajuda, concluded that Indonesians had ‘reached a point of no return’ as far as 
commitment to democracy was concerned. ‘Maybe 5 per cent [of the population] want a 
return to authoritarian presidents,’ he elaborated, citing ‘a poll taken a few years ago’, 
whereas ‘72 per cent of people want democracy’ (Hartcher 2013).  
 
<Figure 3.1: Map of the Riau Islands> 
 
With such assessments in mind, and drawing on over thirty months of fieldwork in 
Indonesia’s Riau Islands Province (Figure 3.1), this chapter seeks to make sense of a category 
of people who present a curious ethnographic puzzle. These are people like Syamsuddin who, 
having once expressed a strong commitment to democratic principles and practices, had now 
come to view them with suspicion or disdain. Two points should be stressed at the outset. 
Firstly, not all Riau Islanders shared these sensibilities. Many delighted in democracy; others 
had always been hostile to the idea that it was the best form of government. Nevertheless 
there was a significant – and seemingly growing – minority of citizens who were changing 
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their mind about democracy as a political form. Understanding why they were doing so is 
particularly important given evidence that suggests this may be a broader national trend.2 
Secondly, I am not concerned in this paper with the question of why someone might be 
opposed to democracy per se, so much as understanding why, having once joyfully 
participated in the ‘eruption of the political’ that Byron Good (2012: 528) describes as having 
followed the resignation of Suharto and which my informants often described as a ‘euphoria’, 
someone might now have come to abandon their faith in democracy and thereby adopt what I 
would describe as a ‘post-democratic’ subject position. My hope is that this specific 
empirical puzzle might also raise some interesting contributions to broader anthropological 
discussions of ethical self-cultivation, how democracy is inhabited and how political 
subjectivity articulates with systemic change.  
   
A brief history of Indonesian democracy 
Although the suitability of ‘Western style democracy’ for Indonesian culture had been hotly 
debated since colonial times, with opponents suggesting its emphasis on rules and procedures 
left insufficient scope for leaders to exercise their kebidjaksanaan – or ‘personal discretion or 
discernment’ (Tsuchiya 1987), Indonesia was established as a constitutional democracy upon 
its independence. This decision partly reflected the personal commitments of key 
revolutionaries to liberal democratic principles (Feith 1963: 313), but also a desire to forge 
Indonesia as the ‘social, economic and political equal’ of other nations seen as ‘modern’ 
(McVey 1994: 4-5). However, when the early years of independence were beset by problems 
ranging from spiralling inflation to regionalist insurgencies, the President, Sukarno, was 
quick to assert that ‘Western-style democracy’ was to blame.3 
Thereafter the nation witnessed successive attempts to craft a superior political 
system. Having suppressed regionalist rebellions in coalition with the Army, 1959 saw 
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Sukarno introduce a new system of rule, which he termed ‘Guided Democracy’. This was a 
system of government based not on the principle that ‘fifty per cent plus one are always 
right’, which he associated with ‘Western individualism’ but rather ‘real Indonesian 
democracy’ in which decisions were based on consensus and discussion, but steered by the 
discerning wisdom of a revered and trusted leader (Feith 2007 [1962]: 515; Tsuchiya 1987: 
213-5). Parliamentary institutions were marginalised from the political process, with most 
issues discussed at meetings of the presidentially appointed National Council and at ad hoc 
conferences of military commanders. Civil liberties, such as freedom of the press, were 
curtailed. ‘To many observers,’ Feith (1963: 326) notes, ‘the new political order looked like 
dictatorship’. 
 As the 1960s progressed, however, there was increasing dissatisfaction with 
Sukarno’s management of the rapidly weakening economy, his belligerence towards 
Malaysia, and his increasing closeness to the Indonesian Communist Party. Following an 
alleged Communist coup attempt in September 1965, the then military general Suharto was 
given authority by the President to secure order across Indonesia. Through a series of 
manoeuvrings he purged the military, government, and parliament of pro-Sukarno elements, 
stripped Sukarno of the title of President, and installed himself as the ruler of Indonesia. Mass 
violence broke out across the nation, as alleged communists were massacred in their 
thousands. The nation having been ‘purged’ of this ideological ‘threat’, Suharto claimed that 
his ‘New Order’ regime would allow Indonesia to enjoy a ‘healthy democracy’ (Hooker 
1993: 277), which he named ‘Pancasila Democracy’ after the nation’s civic philosophy. 
As a system ‘originat[ing] from an understanding of family values and mutual 
cooperation’, and in which ‘opposition groups found in liberal democracies are unknown’, 
Suharto’s (2003 [1967]: 38-39) conception of ‘Pancasila Democracy’ bore many 
resemblances to the paternalistic ‘Guided Democracy’ that it superseded. Regular elections, 
 6 
referred to as ‘festivals of democracy’ (pesta demokrasi) did take place, but Suharto used his 
authoritarian powers to interfere with the working of the two opposition parties that he 
allowed to run against his own Golkar party, ensuring they never posed credible challenges to 
his power (Slater 2007: 102). All the while, state discourse, including that taught in the 
national curriculum, emphasised the incompatibility of liberal democracy with the Indonesian 
national character, and cited the ‘anarchy’ and ‘incompetent’ governance that Indonesia had 
experienced in the 1950s as evidence to that effect (Bourchier 1994). 
 Nevertheless, there were activist voices lobbying for more transparent, liberal and 
democratic forms of governance: an argument justified both on first principles and on the 
concept of securing membership in ‘world culture’ (Crouch 1994; Soetjipto Wirosardjono 
1994). When the protests of self-styled ‘pro-democracy’ activists, together with the 
devastating devaluation of the rupiah, prompted Suharto to resign, this liberal 
conceptualisation of ‘democracy’ became dominant. Substantial reforms were passed to 
support the prospect of free and fair elections, a dramatic decentralisation programme was 
implemented in the name of supporting democratisation (this had particular implications for 
the Riau Islands, which became a new province as a result), and the New Order regime was 
retrospectively seen – whether affectionately or with horror – as a system that had been 
‘authoritarian’ (otoriter).4 
 For the majority of Riau Islanders alive today, then, ‘democracy’ as they now know it 
is something that they had heard a great deal about – both positive and negative – without 
having ever directly experienced it in their lifetimes prior to 1998, and certainly never as a 
stable political system. This was something that people in the province were acutely aware 
of, and so, alongside the institutional and civil liberty indicators that have typically been 
synonymous with ‘third wave’ democratisations, they also spoke of ‘democratisation’ when 
describing the refashioning of the ways in which one would relate to themselves and others. 
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Issues such as how citizens interacted with and related to the political classes were now open 
for creative re-thinking (see e.g. Simandjuntak 2009), as were questions of how to 
appropriately articulate and listen to political wishes, and how to inhabit and ‘savour’ one’s 
new found freedoms.  
Such efforts, exemplified by Syamsuddin’s training himself to ‘think and speak’ like 
Barack Obama, but also various efforts to ‘democratise the workplace’, ‘democratise the 
family’, or simply become a new form of political subject all represent conscious 
vernacularisations of democracy – to borrow a phrase coined by Lucia Michelutti (2007) to 
describe Indian engagements with democratic forms of life. Unlike in the Indian case, 
however, it would be wrong to say that Riau Islanders’ experiments in ‘vernacularisation’ 
have necessarily led to democratic ideas being ‘embedded in…. social and cultural practices 
[and] entrenched in the consciousness of ordinary people’ (ibid.: 639). Such analysis implies 
a depth and finality that stands at odds with many of my informants’ dramatic changes of 
heart. Instead, I will argue, these vernacularisation processes – which we can also understand 
as processes of acquiring the ‘dispositional competencies and affective and perceptual 
orientations’ that Faubion (2011: 65) sees as a prerequisite to the occupancy of a fully 
realised subject position – were often presented to me as ones that had short-circuited 
because of the new relational dynamics and forms of sociality to which they had given rise. 
Democratic citizenship was then abandoned as an ethical and/or aspirational telos5 as Riau 
Islanders, whilst still fundamentally envisaging themselves as liberal subjects entitled to 
adjudicate between alternative political systems, began to place their hopes in the prospect of 
alternative political forms. 
 Theoretically, this phenomenon sets a challenging agenda for the anthropology of 
democracy. Many fine studies within the subfield have traced the forms of disillusionment 
and dissatisfaction that emerge from incompatibilities between liberal democratic models of 
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politics and locally prevalent notions of moral behaviour, personhood, and leadership (see 
e.g. Ferme 1998; Hickel 2015; West 2008). However, such a line of argumentation cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to post-democratic Riau Islanders like Syamsuddin, since it would 
struggle to explain the intense initial identification with democratic ideals from which they 
are now moving away. A model is required that is more attentive to the unfolding process and 
changing momentum of the ethical life of democratic citizens and that can account for how 
affinities and incompatibilities with the ideal of ‘democracy’ are themselves socially 
produced. 
At present, scholars tend to explain such emergent feelings of dissatisfaction with 
democracy in one of two ways. The first, which is the dominant approach within political 
science, argues that citizens are ‘disappointed’ when democratic statecraft fails to deliver the 
quality of governance to which they aspired. If economic growth is limited and corruption is 
high, the efficiency of a strongman or CEO-style technocrat can tempt citizens’ aspirations 
away from democracy (Chang et al. 2007; Diamond 2008; Kurlantzick 2013). But this 
analysis, as Carothers (2009: 12) notes, struggles to explain why concerns with governance 
and economic development should come to outweigh the benefits of free speech, a free press, 
and checks on the powers of the military and the police. Yet whilst Carothers sees this flaw in 
his colleagues’ reasoning as a reason for scholars to temper their democratic pessimism, I see 
it as an invitation to interrogate more precisely what issues matter most to citizens when they 
reflect on democratic forms of sociality – and why. Indeed, when we pay closer attention to 
both the ethical imagination and the concerns that dominate Riau Islanders’ accounts of their 
biographical transformations under democracy, we can quickly see that the ‘freedoms’ 
associated with democracy may, over time, come to be experienced as less positive than 
Carothers – or Indonesianists such as Brenner (2007) and Day (2007) – might suggest. I 
commonly heard Indonesians lament that the self-interest and enjoyment of others, or their 
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own ‘selfish’ desires, had had a destructive effect upon both political and social relations; 
others reported that democratisation had made them ‘too free’. 
 So why should democratic sociality feel so unpalatable? A second approach to 
democratic dissatisfaction, exemplified by Hansen’s (2012) recent ethnography of the South 
African township of Chatsworth, argues that a transition to democracy necessarily elicits 
feelings of melancholia. By this logic, the dissolution of a repressive regime (such as that of 
South Africa’s apartheid era) induces a Hegelian ‘unhappy consciousness’ (ibid.: 12), 
presenting citizens with the burdensome responsibility of authoring their own sense of self 
and purpose. The result, Hansen argues, is a ‘pervasive sense of loss and displacement’ 
anchored to melancholic behaviours of ‘self-reproach and self-reviling’ (ibid.: 16). And while 
in Chatsworth, this atmosphere of melancholia is compounded by a sense that nostalgia for 
apartheid can never be articulated in those terms (ibid.: 12), in other contexts – such as post-
Suharto Indonesia, where the memory of authoritarianism is less deeply embedded in a 
politics of racial inequality,6 the possibility of voicing authoritarian nostalgia seems 
immediately more thinkable. Where Hansen’s argument makes a substantive advance to the 
anthropology of democracy is in his willingness to place the affective and psychological 
consequences of democratisation at the heart of his account. However, his argument is 
compromised by its assumption – evident in his equivocation of authoritarianism with 
Hegel’s lord-bondsman dyad – that those living under authoritarian rule have such little sense 
of alternative possibilities that life after liberation necessarily presents an existential burden. 
It thus struggles to accommodate situations such as Indonesia, where citizens entering the 
nascent democracy carried explicit, if impressionistic, visions of the democratic subjects that 
they wanted to become. 
Rather than following Hansen in seeing the negative affect of democratisation as an 
inaugural element in analysis, we should instead examine how specific attempts to acquire 
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the competencies and orientations of a ‘democratic citizen’ may themselves generate 
unexpected and painful dilemmas. It would then not be the intrinsic burden of self-making, 
but the successes, failures, and challenges that arise from particular instances of self-making 
which generate affects (melancholic or otherwise) that influence both a subject’s disposition 
towards the world, and towards democracy, thereby shaping the horizons of its future self-
cultivation. This approach to democracy’s inhabitation requires a biographically-grounded 
understanding of subjects’ changing engagements with the concept as its referent moved 
from an imagined prospect to a concretely experienced and enacted form of life. Person-
centred ethnography, which examines ‘how the individual’s psychology and subjective 
experience both shapes, and is shaped by, social and cultural processes’ (Hollan 2001: 48) 
seems like a promising way forward. However, it raises questions as to how to best generate 
ethnographic description that is attentive to idiosyncrasy whilst still able to make broader 
claims about a general situation.  
 Here I draw inspiration from Nancy Chodorow’s (1999) analysis of gender as both a 
‘cultural and personal construction’. Chodorow observes that individual experiences of 
gender can focus on quite different issues: some of her respondents are preoccupied with 
body image, others with anger, others with status, yet all these ‘personal meanings’ of gender 
are nevertheless recognisable as part of the late twentieth-century American genderscape 
(ibid: 88-89). From a whole set of ideas about gender that circulate in discourse, certain 
elements have come to be ‘emotionally particularized’ (ibid.: 215) , and projectively and 
introjectively recast over the subject’s lifetime, through the specific emotionally charged 
matrices of relations in which he or she is embedded. In this way, cultural and linguistic 
categories are given ‘personal animation’ (ibid.: 76) so as to generate a way of inhabiting a 
gendered subject position that is uniquely individual but nevertheless recognisably American.  
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 Building on this argument, it seems productive to investigate how similar kinds of 
personal meanings might also surround political life – a field as saturated with concerns 
about self-expression, acceptance, membership and status as is gender performativity. As 
such, we might expect to observe uniquely individual but nevertheless recognisably 
Indonesian flavours to how Riau Islanders inhabit the subject position of ‘democratic citizen’ 
– and indeed, how willing they are to continue inhabiting it. Through a more individualised 
analysis, we can develop richer and more diversely textured understandings of post-
democratic sentiment (and indeed democracy’s inhabitation) than those afforded by 
explanations focused on the quality of governance or Hansen’s unduly deterministic 
psychological model. Yet while personal meanings are precisely that – personal, and 
therefore idiosyncratic – cultural, political and institutional arrangements not only constrain 
the ideas that might become integral to the subject’s sense of self, they also encourage and 
institute particular forms of sociality – particular emotionally charged matrices of relations – 
in which certain meanings of political life, self-expression and ‘free’ action become 
especially likely to be forged. Such an approach promises a more psychologically accurate 
portrait of why subjects may come to find democracy difficult to inhabit even in those cases 
where they were initially strongly drawn to democratic social imaginaries and value systems.  
 
Fio’s Story 
The first time I met Fio, he didn’t make much of an impression on me. I’d been invited home 
by his younger brother Iyan – the one their father was disappointed in and who locals said 
gleamed like a knife, but cut like one too – and quickly found myself captivated. Iyan was an 
engaging host, regaling me with tales of dodging wild boar on his motorbike at night, while 
Yanto, their lodger, offered fascinating descriptions of trapping the boar in the jungle, tying 
their snouts with twine, and rowing them to market for export to Singapore. And then there 
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was Fio, the oldest surviving sibling, approaching thirty and still not married: a wiry, nervy 
man who stood on the edges of the group and only laughed after someone else had already 
begun to.  
Fio did tell me one story – of how, as well as setting up a catfish farm, he’d started 
working on a small island to the south, teaching maths and computing to children under 
twelve. This wasn’t a story of pigs and adventure, just mundane detail: it was a long journey 
to the island, the boats were only fortnightly, hardly anyone lived there, he didn’t know what 
to do with himself, he went fishing a lot. He showed me some photos. Fio with a fish. And 
then another one: Fio, trying to smile, but with his brow so furrowed that it looked like a 
grimace. That’s how he was feeling on the journey, he told me. I did think there was 
something arresting about the picture, but then Iyan began to share anecdotes of his 
misadventures when fishing, and I quickly forgot all about it. Then out of the blue, a few 
weeks later, I received a text message from Fio. He was in Tanjung Pinang for a training 
seminar and suggested we meet for dinner at his hotel.  
Fio had been hoping to order fried catfish – his favourite – but it was off the menu. So 
we opted for kwetiau goreng, my choice, a hearty mix of flat rice noodles and seafood fried 
with spices and treacly soy sauce. It tasted good to me, but Fio was not touching his food. He 
seemed uncomfortable; nervous. I asked him what was wrong. He liked me, he said shakily, 
and wanted to be friends with me, but he was aware that I didn’t yet know what he was 
‘really like’. If I knew ‘the truth about him’, he feared, I would no longer want to know him. 
 ‘When I was younger,’ he said, his voice almost a whisper, ‘I used to be active in… 
democracy.’ I didn’t know how to respond. I took a mouthful of food to fill the silence; Fio 
poked a prawn through the tarry mass of noodles congealing on his plate. He gave me a 
piercing, earnest look. ‘I was selfish then. It was arrogant of me. Now I am focusing on 
something much better. I’m doing this catfish thing.’ 
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 When Fio had graduated from Senior High School in 2004, the very last thing that he 
wanted to do was pursue further education. His mother, however, had different ideas. She had 
grown up in poverty on the island of Java and her relocation to Lingga – under the 
government’s ill-fated ‘transmigration’ scheme – had done little to ease her family’s 
privations.7 Fio’s mother was adamant that her son should not suffer the poverty that she and 
her husband had, and so she threatened him with a terrible curse.8 ‘She told me that if I didn’t 
get an undergraduate degree, she would disown me as her biological child,’ Fio told me, ‘She 
really valued education. Well, of course, after I heard that, I had no choice. She was 
threatening me with the most terrible thing that a mother could. So I went to Sumatra.’  
 Fio enlisted in an economics program at a private university in a Sumatran city. It was 
here that he got involved in the world of political parties, campaigning on behalf of electoral 
candidates and organising public demonstrations in order to fund his studies. He told me that 
before starting this work, he had always been a very quiet and reserved person, but he forced 
himself to change. However, for reasons that he struggled to articulate, his shift to a more 
outgoing disposition had made him anxious. He worried a lot during this period and found he 
always craved human company in order to get a sense of security. 
 Fio’s time at university also afforded him an opportunity to meet idealistic students 
from across Sumatra who were passionate about forging a more ethical and accountable 
Indonesia. They focused on trying to achieve concrete improvements within their campus, 
including reform of the Economics Faculty, where the Dean stood accused of corruption and 
malpractice, such as requiring a bribe to sign letters confirming students’ graduation. Because 
this was ‘happening too often and becoming too apparent’, Fio and his friends decided that 
something needed to be done, and that it would be appropriate to exercise their democratic 
rights by staging mass demonstrations demanding the Dean’s resignation. Given his previous 
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experience in co-ordinating demonstrations, Fio’s role was to assemble a mass of students for 
the protests – something he told me with a guilty look.  
 ‘When I did the demo we thought if we came together we’d be able to get change in 
the Faculty,’ Fio explained, ‘a new Dean. And yes, we toppled her. But, that’s the thing for 
me. All we did was produce ego and selfishness. We got a bigger ego, rather than improving 
the Faculty members. Maybe that Dean could have been a worker who was better than she 
was. That’s what our demo should have been making her aware of! It should have been 
giving the campus staff advice and feedback so that they would get a new way of thinking 
and would want to develop what they have.’ 
 Reform Era Indonesia’s culture of public demonstrations has been one of the more 
controversial aspects of the nation’s democratisation. This is partly because of the risk of 
violence, but also because of the widespread concern that demonstrations might not reflect 
the desires or opinions of the people who were demonstrating (typically for pay), but rather 
the agendas of the demonstration co-ordinators, themselves presumed to be in the service of 
self-interested elites who were staging the demonstration in order to further their own 
political careers by, for example, discrediting a rival (Bubandt 2014).9  
 My own experience was that demonstrators in the Riau Islands were quick to portray 
their links with political figures as strategic alliances over which they retained control. In 
their view, there was nothing wrong with receiving financial assistance from elites to 
showcase the failings of a rival if that demonstration might also contribute to social justice. 
However, several friends warned me not to believe such claims, suggesting they were simply 
a rehearsed defence that elites had prepared the demonstrators to give to any researchers or 
journalists enquiring about the demonstration. The general opacity of sincerity in democratic 
forms of mobilisation was enough for many to eschew an involvement in politics altogether. 
They liked their social relations to be ‘clear’ (jelas), they said, but in democratic politics 
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everything was murky (gelap). The ‘interests’ (kepentingan) of the powerful could hijack 
everyday forms of sociality and friendship – something these friends were keen to avoid. 
 Against this more general background of moral anxieties surrounding demonstrations, 
Fio’s own narrative of discomfort with his actions is all the more striking for its idiosyncracy. 
Though he could hardly be described as being proud of his general involvement in 
democratic politics, what led him to decry his involvement as shameful was not the purchase 
of his services by local elites. It was the success of a demonstration in the service of a 
campaign that he considered to be both morally justified and of practical urgency given how 
important it was for him to secure his own graduation certificate. Rather than being 
uncomfortable that he had become a vehicle for the interests of others, it was the successful 
realisation of his own ‘selfish’ desires that had provoked his anxieties. 
 Our hotel dinner suggested that these anxieties were profoundly relational. Fio was 
worried I would judge him – and reject him. That makes sense in the context of a social 
milieu in which demonstrating is viewed with considerable ambivalence, and I had 
encountered similar discomfort before. Robet, for example, a politics student at a local 
university, was quite articulate about his own discomfort at having participated in several 
student demonstrations. ‘I don’t want to be anarchistic’, he told me (the term has 
connotations with violence), ‘but students need to be critical, and sharp in their criticism!’ 
But while Robet felt uncomfortable about the stigma surrounding an activity he nevertheless 
felt to be justified, Fio’s ambivalence went beyond moral ideologies and social imaginaries of 
‘the demo’, involving much more personal responses to the expression and fulfilment of his 
own desires. 
 Looking over my conversations with Fio, a striking theme was that the fulfilment of 
his political desire – to topple the Dean – had not proven satisfying. This was evident less in 
the reporting of the demonstration than in its repeated juxtaposition with alternatives that 
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were proven or imagined to be more affectively satisfying. His counterproposal of giving the 
Dean ‘feedback’ was the first such example, but he later drew a contrast between his 
involvement in ‘democracy’ and his ongoing attempts to develop a catfish farming business: 
 
Fio: I’m doing this catfish thing, and if a government department (Dinas) is 
interested and wants to help, they can come, they can help, and we’ll be able to 
work together. I think it’s better than if I did the sorts of things I used to. And God 
willing, there’s someone from the Department of Farming who’s interested! […] 
   They just have to print out their operational data. They want to help, but the 
money isn’t here yet, maybe [next month]. And then I can build up the business, 
even though I’m only getting fifty per cent [of the profits]. That, for me, has 
generated a bit of enthusiasm amongst my friends, but also enthusiasm within my 
own self. I’m doing something and there’s also a person – a Department – that 
wants to support what I’m doing. 
 
Here, the prospect of ‘working together’ with the government by means of receiving an 
agricultural subsidy, was appealing not only because it promised to provide Fio with money 
(which he needed, having set up his catfish pond on credit) but also because it ‘generated 
enthusiasm within his own self’ (memberi semangat pada diri Fio). There was something 
affectively satisfying about being involved in relations of mutual care and support, whether 
those of political sponsorship or relations of feedback, that had been absent from toppling the 
Dean. 
How then should we account for the transformative feelings of horror and shame that 
fell upon Fio, and that seemed to still be affecting him quite viscerally as he projected them 
onto me? One answer to this question – what I call ‘the political ideology explanation’ – 
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would emphasise how, under ‘Pancasila Democracy’, mutual support, working together and 
co-operation were all widely valorised in national ideology, whilst ‘anarchistic’ expressions 
of dissent were discouraged. Could it be that Fio, still subjectivated by those discourses (or 
their contemporary parallels), found himself torn between New Order and post-Suharto 
visions of ethical politics and so eventually came to look back on his actions with regret? 
Possibly. But this kind of explanation, premised on enduring cultural/political values – 
simply raises further questions, such as why similar tensions didn’t also run through his other 
demonstrations, why it was the New Order values (and not the democratic values) that won 
out, and why the event was remembered in such a viscerally disturbing way. 
The emphasis that Fio himself placed on selfishness, and its juxtaposition with 
relations of care and mutual support suggests that a productive alternative perspective might 
come from an approach that historicised Fio’s relationship to his own desires within the 
context of the emotionally charged relationships that he experienced throughout his life. 
Certainly, there seems to be sufficient evidence in the life histories that I collected from both 
Fio and his relatives to suggest that Fio’s relationships to his desires had long been 
problematic for him (and problematised by those around him). There was his history of 
having been ‘very quiet’, and his extreme anxiety and ‘need to be around people’ once he 
started getting involved in a job that required him to express views as if they were his own. 
No wonder travelling to a remote island was enough to shadow his face with a dark frown. 
There was the way he always let kids in his classroom pop out for drinks and snacks if they 
wanted, because ‘nobody likes a strict teacher’. Even his presence in Sumatra was a result of 
his suppressing his own desires in order to please his mother and secure his status as the 
favoured child. Perhaps this pattern is unsurprising. According to his siblings, and by his 
father’s own admission, Fio had been brought up under a parenting style which encouraged 
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the children to disavow their own desires and preferences in favour of what their parents 
thought would allow them to escape the poverty of the transmigration village.  
Indeed, Fio’s childhood seems to have exemplified the pattern that Keeler (1983: 155) 
documented in a classic paper on Indonesian conceptions of shame, in which older children 
in Javanese families were expected to suppress their own desires (previously heavily 
indulged) in favour of those of their younger siblings. For Keeler, learning that one should 
disavow one’s desire in this way marks an inaugural discovery of social fear, and the 
recognition that inappropriate behaviour – one’s own or others’ – should make a child 
ashamed. Clinical psychologists in America have also found that patients who were forced to 
forego their own wishes, in the face of emotional violence on the part of their parents, may 
grow up to experience deep ambivalences towards their own desires: feeling a strong wish to 
express them and yet feelings of crippling guilt and selfishness when those desires are 
fulfilled (Davies 2009, and see Chapin 2010 for a comparative ethnographic case). Fio still 
claims that his ‘biggest weakness’ is that he is ‘quick to make friends, and then quick to 
follow them and will do whatever they suggest’, a claim which suggests a pattern of 
disavowing his desires to secure the approval of others continues, almost impulsively, to 
characterise many relationships in his life. Even his friendship with me involved him putting 
me in a position of power and judgement over him from a very early stage.  
We can thus see how the radical new opportunities for expressing one’s desires in a 
socially approved form that an involvement in democratic politics presented might have 
proven attractive to Fio and yet left him feeling uncomfortable and guilty upon their eventual 
fulfilment, (particularly, perhaps, after this led to the firing of an authority figure).  By 
contrast, the mode of political engagement that Fio now aspired to was one of ‘feedback’ and 
‘working together’ where he might be able to express his desires in efficacious ways without 
disrupting harmonious, hierarchical relationships. It should be stressed, however, that such a 
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reading of the material is not really an alternative to the ‘political ideology explanation’ 
described earlier so much as a complement to it, since the parenting practices that Keeler 
ascribes to ‘Javanese culture’ were themselves powerfully shaped and reinforced by the New 
Order, which premised its authoritarianism on ‘family values’ whilst simultaneously 
propagating a much more authoritarian vision of the family than had previously been in 
circulation (Brenner 1998: 232-257). Several male Riau Islanders testified they had ‘ruled’ 
their households ‘as if they were Suharto’, ‘with an iron fist’, ‘in a military style’ or ‘with 
coercion and force’. They had seen Suharto, ‘the father of the nation’, as exemplifying the 
kind of firm leadership that they should also enact as fathers, even though many now 
regretted this behaviour and were struggling to reorganise their family lives in more 
‘democratic’ ways. Of course, not every family will have had this character, and not all such 
families will have produced subjects as conflicted about their desires as Fio. Yet the 
promotion of particular family forms and values makes these kinds of psychological 
dynamics especially likely, adding a further layer of understanding to the analysis of why 
some Indonesians have a conflicted relationship to democratic practices that involve the open 
expression of their opinions and desires despite declaring themselves intellectually convinced 
by ‘democratic values’.  
Further support for this argument comes from examining how families and 
childrearing were themselves conceptualised as sites of democratisation, and by examining 
which vernacularisations of democracy proved most popular and sustainable. Interestingly, 
the more stable variants typically involved a vision not unlike Fio’s preferred sociality, 
emphasising ‘feedback’ and ‘working together’. Whilst more radical models premised on 
majoritarian suffrage were practiced by some families, one Chinese schoolgirl explaining 
how her family held ‘elections’ whenever big decisions like where to go on holiday needed to 
be made, such a practice – in which the father’s ‘vote’ could be easily trumped by the 
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collective will of his children – was relatively uncommon. The model of democratic kinship 
that found much wider support kept the father as ‘head of household’ and ultimate source of 
domestic authority, but nevertheless involved a significant change in the structure of 
relations. A Batam Pos feature on how to be a democratic family (Ratna Irtatik 2012) cites 
one father, Darno, who explains how he allows his wife and children the freedom to express 
their desires. As long as he deems these desires to be ‘good and proper’, he (and all family 
members) will support them as much as possible. Thus, when his wife decided she would like 
to start a business, Darno offered his full support – but only once he had decided that this was 
a good and proper thing to which to aspire. He describes his style of being a father and 
husband as one that ‘opens opportunities for responsible freedoms’. contrasting it with his 
own ‘military-style’ upbringing. Clearly, then, how to balance individual desires with 
deference to established authority stands out as an ethical problem for Darno and his family, 
as they embrace Indonesia’s democratisation. More interestingly still, this has been assumed 
to be of sufficient relevance to the newspapers’ readership to be the centrepiece of a feature 
on how to become democratic.  
 In Darno’s case as much as Fio’s, the initial embrace of democracy, and the trajectory 
of its subsequent vernacularisation or rejection is explicable not just in terms of values or 
ideologies that were disseminated under the New Order, but embodied and affectively-
charged modes of relating to oneself and others that were instituted during that period and 
which it could feel deeply uncomfortable to break or shake off, even when one might have 
intellectual sympathy for alternative ‘democratic’ values. And for Fio himself, these 
difficulties had led the very concept of ‘democracy’ to become one that he now wanted to 
distance himself from. He told me that he was making sure he would have no more 
involvement with ‘democracy’ and would instead focus on developing his business, and that 
he would be warning his friends off getting involved in democratic life. These powerful 
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feelings that stemmed from just one formal dimension of democratisation had come, at least 
for now, to inflect his assessment of the entire process of reform. 
  
Maznah’s story 
For Fio, political life had become charged with personal meanings that had led him to adopt 
an outlook with considerable post-democratic potential. But there were also many people 
who did not only express dissatisfaction with democratic forms of life: they explicitly longed 
for the reintroduction of a more authoritarian form of politics. These sentiments were 
sometimes expressed in terms of the desire for a theocracy (usually an Islamic caliphate), but 
more frequently as a wish to return to ‘an authoritarian regime’s like Suharto’. This latter 
phenomenon has often been analysed in terms of a nostalgia for the New Order regime, 
prompted by the perception that governance was of better quality in the past, especially as 
regards the management of the economy (Mietzner 2009), while the former is often proposed 
by its Indonesian advocates as a novel solution to these very same problems (Hasan 2008: 
38). However, my ethnographic materials show that authoritarianism need not be desired in 
its own right. Rather, in a context where radical socialism remains extremely unpopular (a 
legacy of the killings of communists in the 1960s), authoritarianism may represent the only 
viable alternative to a democracy that has acquired a personal meaning that makes the status 
quo psychologically untenable. Once again, to understand this, we must appreciate how 
democracy can threaten the self by assaulting the unconscious or conscious identifications 
and relationships that are fundamental to Riau Islanders’ senses of who they are.  
 A Malay housewife in her seventies, Maznah told me that she had ‘always been 
interested in politics’. She wasn’t certain where that interest had come from, but suspected it 
could be traced to the influence of her father. This man, Batin Osman, had been the headman 
of a small island to the west of Bintan during the colonial period – an island which I will call 
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‘Pulau Empat’ to protect Osman and Maznah’s real identities. Maznah had been very close to 
her father during her childhood: she had listened with interest to stories of his work, and 
sometimes accompanied him on his journeys to meet with Dutch officials or other ‘important 
people’. However, her family was thrown into turmoil in 1942, when Batin Osman was 
murdered by a Chinese plantation worker who he had intercepted committing a theft. Shortly 
afterwards, Maznah moved to Tanjung Pinang.  
 Maznah’s first active foray into ‘politics’ (as she termed it) had been in the early 
1960s, when Indonesia was in a state of Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia regarding 
its proposed expansion to include Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. ‘I decided I would join a 
group of volunteers,’ she explained. ‘There were four men, and then two women – me and 
another – and we spent our time hunting for Malaysian spies in the jungle. I didn’t get any 
wages for the work, but I didn’t mind. It was important to do it for the good of my own 
country. I’m lucky my husband was never a jealous man. If he had been, he might have 
forbidden me from going into the jungle late at night with four other men!’ She laughed, and 
told me that ever since her jungle outings she had found herself increasingly interested in 
politics and affairs of state.  
 When reformasi began, she seized the opportunity to get involved in political 
campaigns to ‘try and get the very best for the Riau Islands’. She had helped the former 
regent of the Riau Archipelago, Hoezrin Hood, come up with a strategy to lobby for 
provincial autonomy, and she had been an enthusiastic participant in several rounds of 
electoral campaigning. But here the emphasis was very firmly on the ‘had’. We were talking 
in August 2012, just a few months before Tanjung Pinang’s mayoral elections, and 
speculation over who should and would win the election was reaching a fever pitch. Yet 
Maznah, despite having been approached by several of the candidates’ campaign teams, was 
refusing to play any role in this election. 
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 ‘Democracy! I don’t want anything more to do with it!’ she exclaimed. ‘Did you 
know that at the last gubernatorial election, I did a lot of campaigning for one of the 
candidates? I attended his strategy meetings, discussed policies with him. One night I stayed 
at the meetings in Batam so late that I had to be escorted back by a private speedboat.’ There 
was almost a hint of pride as she recalled this – or at least a nostalgic fondness – before her 
voice hardened. ‘But that didn’t count for anything!’ 
 In the run up to the election, the campaign team had made a pledge that if their 
candidate received a majority of votes on Empat, he would repair a local mosque which was 
in an extremely poor condition. The walls were crumbling, the roof was leaking, and this was 
causing great distress to Empat Islanders who could not afford to repair the mosque 
themselves. Maznah spent several weeks campaigning in Empat and the surrounding islands, 
and she placed a heavy emphasis on the fact that a vote for this candidate would be a vote to 
restore the mosque to its former glory. At the election, Empat Islanders voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of the candidate Maznah was supporting, and she was convinced 
this was due to her effective campaigning activities, and the fact that she was well-known and 
respected in the region, especially by people who could remember or knew of her father.
 Several months after the election, however, the residents of Empat contacted Maznah 
to complain that the mosque was still in a state of disrepair. No steps appeared to have been 
taken to improve it. Maznah was horrified. ‘Nick,’ she explained, ‘you know as well as I do 
that I’m an old lady now. If I lie, then all my life and everything that I have done in it means 
nothing.’ 
There were several reasons for Maznah’s distress. Lying, or telling an untruth, was 
something she considered a serious sin, capable of annulling a life of good deeds (see Long 
2013: 77). But it would also damage her reputation, along with that of her father’s name. She 
instantly went to visit the candidates and told them how angry and upset with them she was. 
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A week later, sand started to arrive and within a short period of time the mosque was 
repaired. The damage had been mitigated, but Maznah still felt very embarrassed about the 
incident and angry that she had been turned into a liar by her involvement in the political 
campaign. Her integrity as a campaigner had been placed in the hands of a team who actually 
did not care about her or the mosque on Empat at all. She told me she was not going to get 
involved in campaigns ever again, and started warning her children off any involvement in 
democracy. Not only had the Empat incident forced her to realise how potentially deceitful 
and insincere political candidates could be, it had also shown her how easily the reputations 
of good people could be marred by their entanglements in the democratic process. The idea 
that something of this kind might happen to one of her children or grandchildren horrified 
her. She would vote – because she felt it was her duty to do this while democracy was in 
place in Indonesia – but she was hoping that at the next Presidential election ‘somebody 
good’ would be elected and would then outlaw any further elections so that Indonesia could 
‘get on with developing’ as it ‘had under Suharto’.  
 The Empat Island case is in many ways a classic example of the clientelistic politics 
that has been claimed to characterise direct elections in democratic Indonesia, but Maznah’s 
story highlights the poverty of reducing the system purely to a series of instrumental and self-
interested transactions (cf. Palmer 2010). Certainly Maznah would have received payment for 
her activities in the governor’s campaign team, but her own account shows how she viewed 
them not only – and indeed not even principally – as a means of securing income, but also as 
the latest expression of a ‘political’ sensibility that she had been cultivating throughout her 
life, and which was closely associated with her memory of her murdered father. Part of the 
pleasure of campaigning in Empat, I sensed, was that it allowed Maznah to enact the role of a 
beneficent sponsor and leader looking after the islanders (much as her father would have 
done, when working as a batin), even though as a housewife she was structurally 
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disempowered from doing so unless acting on behalf of others. As with her spy-hunting in 
the jungle, service to political institutions and organisations became an integral means of 
securing her own sense of political efficacy. This was the personal meaning that ‘doing 
politics’ carried for Maznah, reflecting an individual and emotionally particularised 
animation of cultural ideas about leadership and the provision of service and resources that 
have long been in circulation in the Malay World (Milner 1982: 23-24). 
 Yet the debacle that had unfolded over repairing the mosque had served to threaten 
the very understanding of her political self that democratisation had initially seemed to 
nurture. As a consequence, democratic politics quickly shifted from being an appealing 
object of contemplation, that would allow her to use her influence to improve collective well-
being on Empat, to a dangerous endeavour that was threatening to ‘good people’. The 
emotional tonality that the concept of ‘democracy’ acquired was thus once again coloured 
both by the personally-motivated ways in which Maznah had sought to experiment with 
democracy, as well as by events having unfolded in a way that threatened the things that were 
of most importance to her image and experience of her self: her ‘good name’, her relations 
with the islanders of Empat, and her perceived obligations to (and identifications with) her 
deceased father. Maznah’s horror – so intense, I think, because it threatened so deeply her 
core sense of who she was – led her to go further than simply disengaging from political 
campaigning. Recognising the potential for similar traumatic experiences to befall ‘good 
people’ in the future, including those about whom she cared very deeply, she was now 
actively hoping for the day when democracy could be overturned. But this was not because of 
the positive features she associated with an authoritarian, election-less regime. She just 
wanted democracy, as she had come to know it, to stop.  
 
Syamsuddin’s story 
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There were further cases where the proposed alternative to democracy was desired not simply 
as a negation of the democratic order, but because the troubles of democracy had prompted 
an identification with its propositional substance. Syamsuddin, the man with whose story I 
opened this chapter, had found the forms of sociality engendered by experiments with 
democracy to be problematic after he had joined the local branch of the Islamic Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). He had actually wanted to be involved in 
political life for a long time, but was too scared to join a party under the New Order. It was 
possible that another party member might actually be a communist, and he would then be 
seen as someone who fraternised with communists (in a political party, no less), which would 
make him vulnerable to imprisonment or assassination. From an early age, then, he had felt 
that the collectivity of collective political mobilisation could be a danger as much as a 
benefit.  He kept his opinions to himself, and read widely. However, under democratisation, 
where even communists could express their views freely, such dangers seemed unlikely, and 
he decided it was time to realise his long-held ambition. Although at the time he joined up he 
had emphasised that joining the PKS could be a way of improving the Riau Islands (and by 
extension Indonesia), he later told me that he had chosen to join as ‘a kind of personal test’: 
 
Was I compatible with the life of a political person? What was it like to be a 
political person? I had once heard that in politics there are no friends and there are 
no enemies. Do you believe that? Well, it’s true! All you have is self-interest. And 
that’s not a problem if we’re on the straight path. Because we don’t want to follow 
another person when he takes us on the wrong path, just because he is our friend. 
But does democracy put us on the straight path? No. 
 
 27 
As with Fio, then, the lifestyle facilitated by the forms of politics made possible by 
democratisation was one that involved a distinctive new way of relating to self and others, one 
that was more radically individualised and anomic (‘there are no friends and no enemies’) and 
which led to a heightened sense of one’s own ‘self-interest’. While it was this very fact that 
became troublesome for Fio, Syamsuddin’s experience was different. 
 His early experiences with the PKS had been wonderful. The members of the local 
branch used to gather in each other’s houses. Syamsuddin reminisced as to how they used to 
talk about ‘important issues: the weaknesses of Muslims, why are many Islamic countries are 
trailing behind the West, things like that. We concluded the problem was that they were no 
longer following the Qur’an and the Sunna – Islam had become their identity but not their 
religion!’ Then it was the 2008 local elections, and the incumbent mayor, Hj Suryatati A 
Manan, wanted to stand for re-election. Symasuddin was adamant that she would be a bad 
choice. ‘In Islam, it’s very clear,’ he explained, ‘women cannot be leaders. If you think about 
it, women, they’re a little bit soft (lembut). They’re weak. They’re emotional. And leaders 
need to be firm. So of course I said that we shouldn’t support her.’ But other members of the 
party wanted to. Endorsing Suryatati would lead to the PKS securing a sizeable amount of 
money, and – given that she was widely predicted to win the election by a comfortable margin 
–put the PKS in a very strong position in local politics. ‘I tried to explain that this was a sin,’ 
Syamsuddin told me, ‘but nobody would listen. I didn’t want to go to hell – I had to leave. But 
it showed me how I arrogant I had been. I had thought I could use democracy to help get 
Indonesia on the straight path. But there is nothing to democracy other than self-interest and 
majority rule. That’s what makes it dangerous.’ 
 Syamsuddin’s difficulties with democracy can be traced in part to the changing role of 
Islam in his life – particularly the influence of an inspirational lecture he had heard from a 
visiting cleric who had claimed that, at the end of the world, Muslims would be divided into 
 28 
seventy-three groups. Only one of those groups – those who had followed Islam perfectly – 
would be allowed into paradise. This had made Syamsuddin much more anxious about 
enforcing an orthodox position on issues such as female political candidacy than he might 
previously have been. Interestingly, though, Syamsuddin’s initial response to this new horizon 
of understanding had been to try and use democratic structures, and in particular his 
membership of an Islamic political party, to build commitment to a more orthodox, 
scripturally grounded Islam within his home community. This was precisely what the long 
PKS discussion sessions had been oriented towards. His problem came when his fellow party-
members broke ranks and, from his point of view, sacrificed their unswerving commitment to 
the Qur’an and the Sunna in favour of their own ‘self-advancement’. (For their part, other 
local PKS members asserted there was no theological problem with supporting a female 
candidate).  
 While he disparaged these developments as caused by the self-interest of others, and a 
flaw of the majoritarian principles at the heart of democratic deliberation – itself a trope that 
had been regularly aired under Sukarno to justify his guided democracy (Feith 2007 [1962]: 
515) – Syamsuddin was quite evidently disappointed with more than just the behaviour of his 
colleagues: he was frustrated with the way that democracy had stripped him of the capacity to 
impose his own vision of the ‘straight path’ on those around him. Although he now 
recognised that it was ‘arrogant’ of him to imagine that he could have done this, his response 
was not to adapt a more measured approach or set himself a more modest goal, but rather to 
phantasmatically identify with the prospect of campaigning for a caliphate, a state where, in 
his terms, political decisions would be ruled not only by the fallible human ‘reason’ (akal) but 
by wahyu: the wisdom of divine radiance that found its clearest expression on earth in the 
writings of the Prophet. 
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Significantly, though, he eschewed any attempt to join a co-ordinated movement that 
sought to establish a theocracy, instead deferring the prospect of being involved in such a 
campaign to an unspecified future date when a ‘better organisation’ might emerge. ‘Right now 
I’m happy just working on my own, he explained, ‘although I haven’t given up [on politics’ 
just yet. There actually are groups supporting a caliphate, like Hizbut Tahrir,10 but they are 
always staging demos with a black flag. They come from Palestine. I don’t like the way they 
make those demos. They aren’t allowed by the Qur’an.’ Certainly, Hizbut Tahrir were a 
controversial group, and Syamsuddin could have had many legitimate reasons for deciding 
not to join them. Yet I also wondered whether, by preserving himself in a world where he 
could advocate his own vision of a ‘straight path’ without encountering any institutionalised 
dissent, Syamsuddin was better able to realise his fantasy of himself as a political figure than 
either democracy or the actual reality of theocratic advocacy would allow.  
As with both Fio and Maznah, such behaviour is consistent with broader patterns of 
relationships in Syamsuddin’s life – especially in the years since he had assumed his position 
as head of a household. He found it very difficult to be contradicted. Several of his earlier jobs 
had come to a premature end due to ‘disagreements’ with managers (a danger he now avoided 
by being the boss of his own business), and he was currently at his wits’ end trying to deal 
with his father. The old man, still living in Syamsuddin’s home town, had decided to marry a 
new wife some forty years his junior, and refused to be persuaded as to the disadvantages of 
such a situation. He was even willing to disown Syamsuddin’s sister if she refused to accept 
the woman as her new step-mother. Syamsuddin found this infuriating. ‘My father is so 
stubborn!’, he complained, ‘it’s always his way, or no way!’ At this point, Syamsuddin’s wife 
caught my eye, and commented, in a tone that mixed wryness with weariness, that her 
husband had grown up to be precisely like his father. In a different way to Fio, then, 
Syamsuddin also found reconciling his desires with those of others to be an area of difficulty 
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in his life, and in a way that appears to reflect a different response to (as well as a different 
position within) a family form that exemplifies the ideologies of patriarchal authority that 
once circulated throughout New Order Indonesia.  
 The better I got to know Syamsuddin, the more easily I could recognise how 
motivations and psychological dynamics related to authority and contradiction might be 
inflecting his encounters with and pronouncements about democracy. Certainly it was events 
associated with these issues that most readily became lightning rods for his criticism. Yet, 
unlike Fio or Maznah, who spoke in openly emotionalised tones of the horror and shame that 
democracy had created for them, Syamsuddin was much more disposed to presenting an 
experience charged with frustrations and affects in coldly intellectual terms.  ‘Under a 
caliphate the public will be able to know they are getting someone who is a good leader,’ he 
once explained, ‘because they know that the leader will be strict in his religion and thus have 
control. There wouldn’t be general elections in this system, because the people are too stupid 
– they might elect anybody on any basis.’ Here, Syamsuddin rehearsed a line of critique that 
has been levelled against democracies in all parts of the world, but had become particularly 
acute in the Riau Archipelago, a region dogged by allegations of ‘poor human resource 
quality’ associated with its indigenous Malay culture and fifty years of ‘internal colonial’ 
neglect (Long 2013: 173-205). ‘A caliphate, he continued, invoking another widely echoed 
trope, ‘would avoid the weaknesses of democracy. Currently people are too free. They have 
latched onto their freedom and are doing anything they want, but it is wrong to do anything 
that you want. Life has to be controlled – and this is where the people of Indonesia and 
especially these Riau Islands are really lacking.’ 
 These are commonly voiced reasons for Indonesians to express alarm about 
democratisation, and although the extent to which Syamsuddin’s fellow citizens really were 
doing ‘anything they wanted’ was overstated in his remarks, his analyses of voter quality and 
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the need to set limits on citizens’ freedoms are not without intellectual merit. What a person-
centred ethnographic perspective allows us to see, however, is the way in which those widely 
circulating and not unpersuasive arguments may have become especially compelling to 
Syamsuddin because of the underlying personal meaning that political participation – which 
included making these very pronouncements – carried for him. If democracy had initially 
been attractive because it offered him the prospect of articulating his views in the public 
sphere in an uncompromising fashion, it was now, following his exit from the PKS, the 
public denouncement of democracy that allowed him to do that very same thing with 
impunity. Was it, then, my observational skills or my imagination that detected a note of glee 
in Syamsuddin’s voice as he brought one of our conversations to a decisive close? 
 ‘I’m anti-democracy now. In fact, I think the democratisation of our state is one of the 
biggest problems we’re facing. You know, Nick, there are some people in the West – and 
now people here are following suit – who say that democracy is the voice of God.11 But I 
disagree. Actually, if you’re a Muslim, I don’t think democracy can be allowed.’ 
 
Conclusion: beyond the political consumer 
The three cases just presented stand as compelling evidence that Indonesians may turn away 
from democracy for reasons that are much more complicated and personal than a simple 
evaluation of whether or not they are the recipients of ‘good governance’ or experiences of 
‘unhappy consciousness’. Each case exemplifies a subjectivity shaped by imaginaries of how 
one should relate to others that are relatively widespread in contemporary Indonesia. Each 
has found the new ways of relating to themselves and others that are either demanded or 
encouraged by democratic forms of political life to be initially attractive but ultimately 
unpalatable, and in each case the rhetoric and concepts by which they come to echo that 
displeasure carries echoes of the language used to disparage liberal democracy in the pre-
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reform period. We can thus see how distinct elements of a widely circulating and 
heterogeneous set of Indonesian discourses concerning political life and citizenship have 
been emotionally particularised in ways that constitute distinct, radically individual, political 
subjectivities that nevertheless share a post-democratic sensibility and, though their actions 
and declarations, stoke the sense of democratic malaise within the Indonesian population as a 
whole. Ironically, then, democracy’s success in creating a public sphere in which citizens are 
able to articulate their opinions is becoming a condition of possibility for its possible 
recession. 
 How, then, should we balance these in-depth but individualised insights against the 
significant body of survey data (summarised in Kurlantzick 2013) that identifies economic 
performance and corruption as the foremost concerns for Indonesians when they come to 
evaluate democracy? This issue is significant for interpreting the Riau Islands material, since 
‘corruption’ and ‘the economy’ were the most immediately declared reasons that my 
interlocutors gave for having lost faith in democracy. Yet we must once again return to the 
question of subjectivity and ask why it is that such lines of argument – by now staples in the 
public sphere – might prove compelling to any given individual at any given time. As I 
suggested in my earlier discussion of Syamsuddin, well-recognised tropes may not always be 
latched onto because of a belief in their intellectual content, but rather/also because of their 
emotional tonality for the subject. Of the three Indonesians discussed above, it was perhaps 
Maznah whose volatility of opinion was the most illuminating in this regard. When speaking 
on the topic of ‘democracy’ or her involvement in campaigning, she would slide into 
invective, denouncing how terrible Indonesia’s economy had become since democratisation, 
claiming that whilst unemployment had once only affected people of Javanese and 
Minangkabau ethnicity, now even Malays – her own ethnic group – were struggling to find 
jobs and being forced to work as manual labourers. Yet on other occasions, when we were 
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discussing her children, or her family’s history, she gave high praise to the reformasi leaders, 
especially Yudhoyono, under whose rule ‘all of her children had been able to find jobs’, and 
noted the improvements in the standards of living that Riau Islanders were beginning to 
enjoy. While cases such as Maznah’s do not negate the very real economic hardships that 
some Indonesians had felt in the reformasi period, especially given the high levels of 
household debt engendered by a rapacious credit industry (see also Stavrakakis, this volume), 
they do reveal that citizens may actively express frustration with ‘the economy’ whilst also, 
on some level, acknowledging that the Indonesian economy is booming and that the Riau 
Islands Province is doing better even than the national average. In such cases, claims about 
the weak economy are not the perspicacious indictments of poor governance that they first 
appear to be. They instead serve as ‘idioms of distress’ (Nichter 1981), a means of expressing 
other, less easily or appropriately articulated disappointments with democracy, in a language 
that would resonate with those who heard it.   
 The practical implications of this argument are significant in a context where both 
scholars and major donor in the fields of democracy promotion and democracy assistance 
(notably USAID and AusAID) are emphasising increased funding for ‘good governance’ 
programs in order to ‘consolidate’ Indonesia’s democratic institutions (Aspinall 2010a). This 
has been done on the understanding that the poor quality of current governance presents the 
most significant risk of democratic backsliding, both in terms of statecraft and popular 
opinion. Yet the material I have presented n this chapter suggests that such an assessment 
rests on a shallow understanding of the subjective difficulties that citizens have with 
democracy, many of which are likely to continue regardless of modest improvements in 
governance.  
 There are theoretical implications as well. By developing person-centred 
ethnographies of citizenship and political life that attend closely to the varieties of subjective 
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investments that shape a population’s apprehension of democracy and lie at the heart of the 
individual changes of heart that comprise, in toto, a broader pattern of ‘democratic recession’, 
my analysis not only offers political anthropology a new way of accounting for the feelings 
of melancholy, ambivalence and sadness that emerge after democratisation, but also a new 
focus for the study of democratic transitions. Placing the matrices of intersubjective relations 
in which subjects come to develop understandings of how to relate their own desires and 
interests to those of others at the heart of the enquiry leaves us better placed to anticipate and 
understand both the pleasures and pains of incipient democratisation. And while it is 
important to stress that these are not limited to family contexts, nor to social forms explicitly 
encouraged by authoritarianism, a provisional conclusion nevertheless seems clear: that the 
ways in which authoritarian regimes give rise to particular patterns of sociality and, in turn, 
particular patterns of psychodynamic engagement with the world can help us to understand 
why the euphoria of democracy is not always as long lasting as we, or our informants, might 
expect.  
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Notes
                                                 
1
 All personal names are pseudonyms. 
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2
 The full extent of this ‘trend’ remains unclear. Some studies indicate that Indonesians’ 
support for democracy has never been especially deep (Lussier and Fish 2012: 72-3) and that 
it has been falling steadily since at least 2003 (Kalinowski 2007: 368), whilst it is widely 
agreed that the period since 2008 has been marked by a rise in nostalgia for Suharto and in 
political support for once-reviled military strongmen. This trend reached its apogee in 2014, 
when former general Prabowo Subianto (perceived by many as a candidate standing for de-
democratisation) almost secured the Indonesian Presidency, attracting 46.9 per cent of the 
vote (Mietzner 2014). However, other studies suggest that even despite high levels of 
dissatisfaction with democratic institutions, public support for democracy remains stable, and 
as high as 83 per cent (ibid.: 124).   
 
3
 The validity of this claim has been widely debated (see Bourchier and Legge 1994). 
Although some scholars have argued that constitutional democracy was incompatible with 
the culture and society of newly independent Indonesia, others believe its decline is better 
attributed to the inexperience of civilian politicians or its deliberate sabotage by the military. 
 
4
 Whilst I am sympathetic to the critiques of the democratic-authoritarian dichotomy (see 
Merkel 2010: 20), my use of the terms reflects the strong emic distinction drawn between 
‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’ by Riau Islanders. 
 
5
 This distinction between ethical and aspirational telos reflects the fact that some informants 
still felt a national duty to enact democracy as well as they could, whilst hoping for immanent 
political reform.   
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6
 Chinese Indonesians were subjected to sustained racial discrimination throughout the New 
Order, but the levels of public awareness and remorse on this issue are not comparable to the 
South African case. 
 
7
 The transmigration scheme involved relocating Indonesians from densely populated areas of 
Java to underpopulated areas elsewhere, where it was hoped they would set up productive 
farms. In practice, transmigrants in Lingga struggled to establish sustainable farming systems 
and many have since returned to Java. 
  
8
 Mothers’ curses are held to be especially powerful in the Malay World because of the tie of 
shared blood (Carsten 1995: 229). 
 
9
 Some Riau Islanders did however see demonstrations as a sincere means of articulating ‘the 
‘people’s aspirations’ – a key trope of reform (Graf 2010: 29). 
 
10
 An international pan-Islamic organization, founded in 1953. 
  
11
 Syamsuddin was probably referring to the ancient proverb ‘vox populi, vox Dei’, which had 
been widely popularised during Indonesia’s initial period of parliamentary democracy in the 
1950s (Feith 1963: 313). 
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